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1. Introduction 
Taxation is high in EU countries. Tax-to-GDP ratios stand at around 40% compared with 25% 
in Japan and the US. This high level of taxation provides the funding of the European social 
model characterised by a high level of public expenditure and transfers. Apart from governing 
powers (armed forces, police, justice), the State provides free services to households 
(education, health); finances public infrastructures, research, culture; pays significant social 
transfers (family policy, minimum income) and social insurance (pensions, unemployment). 
Ageing populations imply higher pensions and health spending; technical progress leads to 
higher education and research spending; rising social exclusion implies higher assistance 
benefits. People ask for more public infrastructure and higher security spending. Military 
spending as well as aid to developing countries seem to be required if countries wish to play a 
major role internationally. All these elements make the rising trend in public spending 
difficult to resist. Besides, European countries think that public spending should be on a 
contributory basis. It makes sense to have people on highest incomes or wealth pay more for 
collective spending, as they benefit most from the way the social system is organised. Taxes 
must reduce income inequalities. It is hence crucial for European countries to remain entitled 
to collect tax revenues, according to democratically agreed rules.  
Section 2 discusses how the European social model is at risk in a global world; it discusses 
several strategies for European taxation: competition, unification, coordination. Section 3 
provides a descriptive analysis of tax structures and trends in Europe. Section 4 deals with 
income tax coordination. Section 5 addresses social contributions coordination. Section 6 
deals with corporate taxation. Section 7 concludes with a strategy for tax co-ordination.  
2. The European social model in a global world 
In recent years, the European social model has been put under pressure both on political and 
economic grounds. In the last two decades, economic policy has moved from implementing 
social-democrat policies to free-market reforms. Priority is now given in many countries to 
strengthening competitiveness and the attractiveness of the country as a location of productive 
activities. Saying that working incentives should be increased both at the upper and lower 
ends of the wage scale governments wish to cut social redistribution and public spending, to 
cut the highest marginal income tax rates and to lower social benefits in order to make the 
poorer work. Governments wish to cut ‘social contributions’ to boost domestic 
competitiveness. This prevailing model makes it difficult to implement tax co-ordination in 
Europe.  
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The European social model is threatened by globalisation that puts tax and social domestic 
systems into competition. Free capital and products mobility enables companies to choose to 
locate their production among industrial economies or between industrial and emerging 
economies. Taxing the more mobile factors (big companies, financial capital, highly skilled 
workers, wealthy people) is more and more difficult, which undermines domestic 
redistribution policies. Some countries may choose to offer low public spending and hence 
need low tax revenues. These countries may thus attract wealthy foreigners, as is the case for 
the UK, although this is not the result of a deliberate policy. The race to the bottom strategy 
aiming at attracting the more mobile factors is all the more successful that a country is small 
(it will be able to attract relatively large capital flows that will raise its tax revenues, albeit 
lowering its tax rates). It may be worth for small countries to introduce low tax rates that will 
attract foreign capital flows (like in Luxemburg or Switzerland). Last, very small countries 
may decide to become a pure ‘tax haven’. Competition may oblige countries either to cut their 
public spending or to tax mainly immobile factors: labour and dwellings. Countries lose the 
ability to implement satisfactory redistribution: similar incomes will not be taxed similarly. In 
a world with free factor mobility, taxation measures would necessarily have a similar and 
immediate counterpart: no redistribution would be possible. Moreover, some economic agents 
may adopt a free rider’s behaviour and benefit from the high level of public spending in a 
country while being taxed in another country. For instance, a high skilled worker educated in 
France (owing to the free education system and family allowances) may decide to leave and 
work in the UK where he will not have to pay for his parents’ pensions. Old and rich people 
may leave the country where they built their wealth to retire and die in a country where 
property and inheritance are tax exempt. Companies may decide to locate their profits in 
country different from the country where their production is located. The development of such 
behaviours would necessarily lead to the expansion of paying schools, private pension 
funds,… 
However, taxes and public spending have not significantly been cut as a share of GDP in 
Europe. The characteristics of the European social model have in no European country been 
fundamentally put into question. No European country has implemented the ‘Big Reform’, 
consisting in cutting strongly taxes and altering their structure. In most cases, reforms have 
applied to specific areas.  
Will European integration, especially the Economic and Monetary Union, the single market 
and the single currency, add to globalisation to put pressure on European tax and social 
systems, or will they help securing the European social model?  
The treaty establishing the European Community and the treaty establishing a constitution for 
Europe stress four ‘fundamental freedoms’: free movement of persons, services, goods and 
capital. However, the texts do not say anything on the need for countries to remain 
responsible for domestic taxation. Besides, the logic of European integration is such that the 
Commission wishes decisions to be taken at its level; it is thus not in favour and may even be 
against measures guaranteeing domestic taxation autonomy. Member states should therefore 
pay attention to keep their fiscal autonomy, although they rarely do. 
The EU has difficulty in introducing a coherent tax system. Taxation is a symbol of domestic 
sovereignty and remains in the hands of national governments. Countries, and not the 
European legislative authorities (Parliament or Council), vote taxes and on decide on how to 
spend tax revenues. Introducing a taxation system consistent with European Treaties, with the 
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subsidiarity principle and the unanimity principle shows how it is difficult to build an 
economic Europe without political integration. European Taxation in Europe is a political 
issue. What should the respective weights of national and European institutions be? Should 
the Commission and the Council be given a major role in future changes of the tax system or 
should domestic choices be maintained? What is the final objective: maintaining the social 
democrat model or moving towards a liberal model? What method should be used: tax 
competition, co-ordination or unification?  
European countries will have to live for a long time with contradictory objectives: keeping 
their domestic autonomy, remaining in charge of domestic tax policy, keeping their freedom 
of introducing new measures while there is a need for harmonisation. One may for instance 
consider that countries should be allowed to set on their own the VAT rate to be applied by 
hairdressers, restaurants, records, alcohol... Conversely, European institutions should check 
that no change in VAT rates is a protectionist measure. Criteria would need to be defined. For 
instance, can a country be allowed: to promote the consumption of services that are by 
definition not imported, to tax heavily imported luxury cars if there is no domestic production, 
to tax wine less than alcohol in vine-producing countries, to tax heavily alcohol in countries 
where alcoholism is high? 
Europe has to choose between three strategies. The first one would consist in aiming – more 
or less rapidly- at the unification of taxation in Europe, on the one hand through the 
introduction of European taxes, on the other hand through the unification of domestic taxes, 
both in terms of rates and bases. This unification would be made necessary with the 
completion of the single market, the increasing mobility of goods, people, capital and 
companies. The elements of taxation remaining domestic would be subject to European rules 
(as is the case today for local taxation). This strategy currently seems an illusion. First, most 
countries dismiss it, wishing to keep their autonomy in taxation matters. A single tax system 
cannot be introduced if there is no legislative European authority entitled to vote taxes. 
Taxation unification requires political and social unification. But Europe has made no precise 
choice in terms of Society: the British, Franco-German, Scandinavian, Southern models differ 
widely.  A single European taxation cannot be implemented as long as citizens do not move 
towards a federal Europe, as long as political and social institutions remain mainly national. 
In the current state of European integration, each country should remain free to set their level 
of public spending, degree of redistribution and social protection system.  
Decision-making has until now been slow and technocratic at the European level. For 
instance, European authorities have kept claiming for lower fiscal deficits despite the 
economic slowdown of 2001. This shows that there is a risk that European institutions do not 
to account for domestic specificities.  
Last, should taxation unification be understood as a single taxation everywhere in Europe, or 
as uniform rules decided by all: for instance, could countries catching up or being in difficult 
times be entitled to implement lower tax rates, albeit receiving community funds (as is 
currently the case at domestic levels), or not? Some think that European institutions are less 
sensitive to industrial lobbying than Member states, hence can more easily introduce painful 
reforms. But is this true? Perhaps industrial lobbying is in fact more powerful in Brussels than 
in Member States, where they be countered by national associations. The European level is 
more appropriate in some areas, such as environment. Will it be possible to maintain different 
benefit taxation rules if European companies develop? Europe could move towards a 
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compromise, where some taxes would be set at the European level and some others not, which 
would raise difficult questions on tax controls and internal coherence of domestic legislations. 
The second strategy would consist in letting tax competition play freely. Each country would 
remain fully responsible for domestic taxation. European citizens and companies would be 
free to decide where they want to settle, work, save and invest. But there is no guarantee that 
this strategy will lead to the taxation system European citizens would like to have. States 
would see their capacity of taxing the more mobile agents (multinational companies, skilled 
workers, financial capital) strongly constrained and this would force them to either raise taxes 
on immobile agents or forget about redistribution policies. A neutral liberal model would 
progressively develop where everyone pays exclusively for the amount of public spending 
they will benefit from, i.e. a model without redistribution. If taxpayers can also pay taxes in 
countries different from their live or work (for instance, a company benefits from public 
infrastructure in a given country, but locates its profits in a tax haven), public infrastructure 
will lose their funding. Such practices make countries open more widely their frontiers and 
weaken their ability to resist the impact of globalisation on their tax receipts. Full tax 
competition would be unenforceable in practice since taxation rules for a company operating 
in several countries have in any case to be defined (multinational companies, non-residents 
savings, etc…) 
In a softer version, the controlled tax competition, countries remain free to implement the 
taxation of their choice on their residents and companies, but harmful tax competition is 
forbidden, i.e. measures consisting in applying lower tax rates on non residents or new 
residents, or foreign companies to attract more profitable tax bases. This is roughly the view 
of the Commission. Derogatory regimes are forbidden, but there is no control on general 
regimes. Hence, a country can decide to attract rich people through abolishing wealth taxation 
provided this applies to all its residents. Unfortunately, controlled tax competition does not 
prevent the race to the bottom since smaller countries can keep on using this kind of 
competition, lowering their tax rates to attract more capital and rich people, while losing 
relatively little in terms of their domestic taxable base. 
According to the tax coordination strategy, the subsidiarity principle should still prevail. 
Taxation systems remain national as much as possible, but are unified when necessary; the 
coexistence of different national taxation systems is run under codes of good conduct 
allowing countries to decide on the taxation of their residents. Besides, some measures are 
more efficient if decided at the European level. However this strategy is difficult to 
implement. It requires international agreements. Harmonisation, even if agreed with partners, 
restricts states tax autonomy.  
The success of such a strategy depends on how easily countries agree on desirable taxation. 
Co-ordination will be difficult if some countries are very liberal while others are very socio-
democrats. Institutional reforms are thus required to allow Member States to preserve their tax 
revenues. The issue should also be politically debated so that each country, each People are 
aware of the need to protect and improve the European social model. 
Member States and the European Commission should implement tax co-ordination for each 
tax, possibly leading to unification, forbiddance of unfair practices (aiming at forbidding tax 
measures targeted to attract tax bases for no good reason), etc. In some cases, minimum rates 
could be introduced. What should be done if differences persist after discussion? We think 
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that the countries wishing to remain responsible for domestic taxation should be entitled to it, 
through refusing to enforce the principles of free movement of people and capital to countries 
with excessively low taxation and refusing to delegate any power to the ECJ in this respect. 
3. Tax structures: where do we stand? 
The 1990’s have been characterized by successive tax reforms, more or less ambitious all over 
Europe. Member States have been confronted with the need to raise their tax revenues in 
order to halt the rise in public deficits and debts entailed by low economic growth in the early 
1980’s and the early 1990’s. The introduction of the single market in 1993 did not affect these 
trends: contrary to the effects expected from the opening of frontiers in the absence of tax 
harmonisation, tax to GDP ratios did not decline in EU countries but rather tended to rise, 
even if less rapidly in the 1990’s than in the 1980’s: the EU-15 tax burden rose from 38.9% of 
GDP in 1990 to 39.6% in 2003. In 2003 tax to GDP ratios were 10 percentage points higher in 
the EU than in Japan or the US (see table 1). Until now, globalisation and tax competition 
have not deprived European countries from revenues. 
Table 1: Tax to GDP ratios, percentage points 
 1990 2003 
Sweden 53.2 50.8 
Denmark 47.1 49.0 
Finland 44.3 44.9 
Belgium 43.2 45.8 
France 43.0 44.2 
Netherlands 42.9 38.8 
Luxembourg 40.8 41.6 
Austria 40.4 43.0 
Italy 38.9 43.4 
Germany 36.8* 36.2 
UK 36.5 35.3 
Ireland 33.5 30.0 
Spain 33.2 35.8 
Greece 29.3 35.9** 
Portugal 29.2 33.9** 
EU-15 38.9 39.6 
Czech Republic  39.9** 
Hungary  38.3** 
Slovak Republic  33.1** 
Poland  32.6** 
Japan 30.2                            25.8** 
US 27.3 25.4 
*1991; ** 2002.  
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2004. 
Divergences remain strong between EU countries, even if some convergence has been 
reached. Tax to GDP ratios are the highest in Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium and 
France and the lowest in the UK, Ireland and Southern countries (Spain, Portugal). The five 
countries with the highest tax to GDP ratios had a ratio of 46.2% in 1990, which rose to 46.9 
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in 2003. The five countries with the lowest tax to GDP ratios had a ratio of 32.3% in 1990, 
which rose to 34.2% in 2003. Convergence has been limited. Tax burdens have significantly 
declined – by more than 3 percentage points - in two countries: the Netherlands and Ireland, 
while they have risen by more than 3 percentage points in 3 countries: Italy, Greece and 
Portugal. 
Changes in the tax structure 
The weights of the different taxes have not varied very much between 1990 and 2002 at the 
EU level (see table 2). All taxes have slightly increased as a percentage of GDP, at the 
exception of social contributions. The latter slightly decreased (by 0.2% of GDP) due to the 
introduction of the CSG (Contribution sociale généralisée) in France and of IRAP in Italy, 
which is to be welcome, as it helps lowering labour taxation, even if to a limited extent. 
Table 2. Tax to GDP ratios in the EU* 
 1990 2002 
Personal income tax 9.7 9.9 
Corporate income tax 2.7 2.7 
Social security contributions 13.1 12.6 
Property tax 1.8 2.4 
Taxes on goods and services 11.1 11.4 
Other taxes 0.5 0.6 
Total 38.9 39.6 
*As a percentage of GDP; Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics 2004. 
Social contributions and taxes on goods and services have a strong weight in the EU as 
compared to the US, whereas personal income taxes weigh less (see table 3). Income tax is 
especially high in Scandinavian countries, contrary to Southern countries keeping a relatively 
« archaic » tax structure (Portugal, Greece, Spain). Corporate taxation is low in Germany and 
Austria, while it is particularly high in Finland and Luxemburg. Social contributions weigh 
heavily on wages in Bismarckian countries (Austria, France, Germany, Sweden, Netherlands), 
whereas they are relatively low in Denmark, Ireland and the UK. Taxes on goods and services 
are particularly high in Denmark (where their weight offsets the absence of employers’ social 
contributions). Two main factors explain the diversity of tax structures: first, the design of 
social protection systems - Bismarckian (high public spending funded by contributions on 
wages), Scandinavian (high spending funded by income taxes), Anglo-Saxon (low public 
spending); second, the contrast between modern systems (high weight of income tax) and 
archaic systems (high weight of indirect taxes). 
What degree of ‘socialisation’? 
Primary public spending amounts to 45% of GDP on average in continental European 
economies, of which 11 percentage points go to pensions, 8 to health, 3 to unemployment 
allowances, 3 to family/housing/poverty, 6 to education/culture, 3 to economic subsidies; 8 to 
collective spending; 3 to capital spending. Pension, health, social assistance and education 
spending are much higher in continental Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries. Thus, any 
significant cut in tax-to-GDP ratios implies a similar cut in public expenditure requires 
privatising and, in a way or another, lower spending directly benefiting households. 
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 Table 3. Tax revenue structures, in terms of tax bases in 2002 
 
As a percentage of GDP 
          Ger. Belg.Austria  SpainDen.  FranceFin. Greece ItalyIreland Lux. Neth. Port. Swe. UK EU-15 Japan USA
10.1 
 
13.0                18.3 28.9 10.4 18.6 10.5 8.9 11.1 14.1 15.4 10.7 9.6 17.7 13.5 12.6 7.8 11.8
9.1                 10.6 14.8 26.0 7.1 14.3 7.6 5.1 7.4 10.9 6.8 7.2 6.0 15.3 10.6 9.9 4.7 10.0
Income taxes 
Of which 
— Households 
— Companies 1.0                 2.4 3.5 2.9 3.2 4.3 2.9 3.8 3.7 3.2 8.6 3.5 3.6 2.4 2.9 2.7 3.1 1.8
14.5 
 
17.4                14.7 1.9 12.6 12.2 17.4 11.8 4.5 12.5 11.2 13.9 9.2 17.5 6.1 12.6 9.9 6.9
14.5                 14.7 14.7 1.7 12.6 12.2 16.3 11.8 4.3 12.5 11.2 13.9 9.2 15.1 6.1 12.3 9.9 6.9
Wage taxes 
of which: 
— Social security contributions 
— Wage taxes 0.0                 2.7 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0
Property taxes 0.8                 0.6 1.5 1.7 2.4 1.1 3.3 1.7 1.5 2.2 3.4 2.1 1.1 1.6 4.3 2.4 2.8 3.2
Taxes on goods and services 10.5                 12.4 11.4 16.2 10.2 13.9 11.2 13.4 11.2 11.4 11.7 12.1 13.9 13.3 11.7 11.4 5.2 4.6
Other taxes  0.0               0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.6* 0.1 0.1 2.6** 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.0 2.9
Total 36.0                  44.0 46.4 48.9 35.6 45.9 44.0 35.9 28.4 42.6 41.8 39.2 33.9 50.2 35.8 39.6 25.8 26.4
* Mainly professional tax; ** Mainly IRAP. 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2004. 
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4. Income taxation: the residence principle 
According to the subsidiarity principle, each country must decide its level of public spending 
and degree of redistribution. This requires that the country keeps control of a significant part 
of its tax revenues. Yet income taxation is one of the taxes that are the less likely to generate 
direct tax competition, if the residence principle is applied, in other words if each country 
taxes all its residents’ incomes. People are less mobile than capital, companies and products. 
An individual may chose to more abroad to escape taxation, but will then change its residence 
and be taxed as a resident in the country where he lives.  
However, tax competition plays more and more for higher earnings people, like stars, 
executives from multinational companies and wealthy people, who may decide to move 
abroad for taxation purposes. An executive earning euros 30,000 per month will pay an 
average tax rate of 38% in Switzerland, 44% in the UK, 62% in France (of which 14% are 
differed wages). Some countries provide specific privileges that induce unfair tax 
competition. EU Member States should reaffirm the right of each country to tax their 
residents. This means that derogatory systems allowing for different taxation on permanent, 
transitory (or newly arrived) residents and non residents should be forbidden. 
Incomes earned and kept abroad by foreign people are tax exempt for 15 years when a 
foreigner settles in the UK and Ireland (remittance basis system). This allows foreigners to 
settle in the UK and pay no personal income tax on income earned in their native countries 
and transferred anywhere abroad. Such a system attracts people with high financial wealth. In 
Denmark and Finland, foreign executives benefit from a derogatory tax regime, in the form of 
an income tax rate lower than for national residents. If such unfair tax competition was to 
develop, some categories of the population would be exempt from paying public expenditure 
if they change their residence country, while earning high incomes and having in general 
benefited from free education spending in their native country. The French government has 
introduced such dangerous measures in 2003, exempting from income tax extra-earnings paid 
to executives moving back to France. The only acceptable measure is tax exemption on 
specific expenses generated by moving abroad. 
Table 4 shows average tax rates in several EU countries for a two-earner couple with two 
children. Column a shows income tax as a percentage of disposable income: this is an 
indicator of the weight of personal income tax as generally felt by individuals. Column b 
shows total income tax payments net of family benefits as a share of total wage costs: this 
ratio is more economic and is not affected by the respective shares of social contributions, 
social benefits and taxes. The first indicator shows a larger dispersion than the second. For a 
two-earner couple on medium wage earnings, the first indicator varies from 7.9% in Spain to 
32.5% in Sweden, while the second indicator varies from 25.2 in the UK to 46.4 in Belgium. 
Countries may be split into two groups: countries where income tax is low (Spain, France, 
Italy, the UK), countries where it is high (Denmark, Sweden, Belgium). In terms of global tax 
burden, taxes are relatively low on low wage earnings in France and the UK. Taxes are also 
low for high incomes in Spain and the UK, whereas they are heavy in Belgium, Denmark and 
Sweden. All in all, the tax burden is small in the UK, but public pensions are low. Conversely, 
the tax burden is high in Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Denmark and France. Taxation is especially 
progressive in France and Belgium, but hardly in Spain and Italy.  
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Table 4. Average tax rates in 2001, two-earner married couple, two children, spouse earning 70% of 
husband’s wage 
0.7 1 2 3 5 Wage level/APW 
a b a b a b a b a b 
Germany* 0 33.2 9.5 40.2 27.1 48.0 34.6 48.7 40.3 48.6 
Austria* 1.6 25.1 13.8 35.7 27.7 43.8 35.6 45.4 41.4 46.9 
Belgium* 20.8 39.9 28.2 46.4 39.1 56.4 49.9 62.2 48.9 66.0 
Denmark** 28.5 33.1 32.5 37.2 43.9 48.0 49.1 52.9 53.0 56.8 
Spain* 3.3 30.6 7.9 33.9 16.9 40.3 21.0 40.2 29.2 40.7 
France* 6.6 23.5 11.2 40.0 16.9 47.9 21.5 51.0 27.5 54.9 
Italy* 13.4 38.0 16.9 42.8 25.8 49.8 30.3 53.0 34.5 56.0 
Netherlands** 12.4 27.1 15.5 32.0 30.1 41.1 37.9 43.6 43.6 46.7 
UK** 12.8 19.0 16.1 25.2 21.5 32.2 26.8 36.1 32.2 40.3 
Sweden** 26.2 42.8 29.0 46.1 37.0 53.1 41.4 57.4 48.4 63.4 
a) Personal income tax/net wage; b) (Personal income tax+social contributions-family benefits)/super gross wage earnings. In France, 
personal income tax includes CSG/CRDS. 
* Entitles to proportional retirement pension; ** Entitles to lump-sum retirement pension. 
Source: Author’s calculations, based on OECD, Taxing Wages, 2000-2001, 2002. 
 
A common trend towards lower tax progressivity can be seen among European countries. The 
French higher marginal tax rate has declined from 56% in 1988 to 48% in 2004. Since 1988, 
higher marginal tax rates have been cut by 11 percentage points in Spain and Germany. The 
introduction of a 2-rate threshold, with the highest rate set at 33% is being considered in Italy. 
These trends follow the strong cuts of higher marginal income tax rates introduced in the US 
in the early 1980s as well as in the UK, where the highest marginal tax rate was cut from 98% 
in 1979 to 40% in 1988. The highest marginal tax rates currently stand around 50% in the EU 
(except in Spain: 45% and the UK: 40%, see table 5). 
Table 5. Higher marginal income tax rates in 2003 (%)  
Germany 48.5 
Austria 50 
Belgium 56.2 
Denmark 59 
Spain 45 
Finland 53.8 
France 53.2 
Italy 46.4 
Netherlands 52 
UK 40 
Sweden 55.5 
Japan 50 
US 45.35 
Source:  
In the future, in a global world, the contradiction between incentive and redistribution policies 
is likely to grow. It will be easier for the upper classes, who win from globalisation, to choose 
where to work and pay taxes. The upper classes may refuse to support the part of the 
population who will be negatively affected by the globalisation process. Governments may 
have no choice but cut strongly highest marginal income tax rates, and even offer derogatory 
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regimes allowing for tax exemption (like stock options), while at the same time income 
disparities will grow. One may consider that European countries should resist these changes 
and agree on a minimum tax rate for high incomes, although this would raise a number of 
technical issues: should an average or a marginal tax rate be set? How to distinguish taxes and 
social contributions? What definition for income – including or not financial income and 
capital gains?  
As concerns wealthy people, tax competition applies also to property and inheritance taxation. 
The weights of these two taxes differ widely in Europe: 1.24 % of GDP in Switzerland, 0.8% 
in Luxembourg and France; 0.5% in Belgium and only 0.2 in the UK, 0.15 in Germany, 
0.05% in Italy (see table 6). In Europe, taxes on wealth remain only in Luxembourg (with a 
rate of 0.5%), Sweden (rate of 1.5%), France (maximum rate: 1.8%), Spain (maximum rate: 
2.5%), Finland (0.9%), the Netherlands (1.2% on financial wealth, but incomes are tax 
exempt). En 2001, Italy abolished inheritance taxes.  
Table 6. Taxes on households’ wealth 
As a percentage of GDP, in 2002 Taxes on wealth Inheritance taxes 
Germany 0.01 0.14 
Austria 0 0.07 
Belgium 0 0.46 
Denmark 0 0.19 
Spain 0.17 0.22 
Finland 0.08 0.32 
France 0.16 0.60 
Greece 0.07 0.23 
Ireland 0 0.12 
Italy 0 0.06 
Luxembourg 0 .71 0.14 
Netherlands 0.01 0.38 
Portugal 0 0.07 
Sweden 0.16 0.13 
UK 0 0.23 
Switzerland 1.04 0.31 
Japan 0 0.29 
US 0 0.32 
Source:  
In 1998, France had introduced an exit tax, i.e. French residents settling abroad had to pay 
26% on accrued capital gains on financial assets. In 2004, the ECJ judged this measure not 
conform to the freedom of establishment. 
There is thus a high risk that tax competition to attract wealthy people strengthens in Europe, 
the principle of freedom of establishment depriving countries with heavy taxation to react. 
Three strategies may then be considered: 
- Race to the bottom: governments will accept not to tax wealth and inheritance, or at least 
will cut them sufficiently so that it will not be worth moving abroad. This would mean that 
the less ‘tax demanding’ countries will design the tax structure in all European countries, 
which in not very democratic. 
 10
- Isolated measures: each country would introduce measures against domestic citizens leaving 
abroad for tax purposes (deprivation of voting rights, honours,…). However, this may not be 
accepted by the ECJ. 
- Affirmation of the right to tax: the countries wishing to keep on taxing their residents reject 
the principle of freedom of establishment in countries where taxation is too low for high 
incomes, wealth and inheritance. This strategy would be set by a group of countries wishing 
to maintain the principle of the European social model, i.e. in favour a redistributive taxation.  
The choice between these strategies is a political one, and should be discussed openly.  
 
4.1. Capital income taxation: a model of European taxation?  
In most European countries, interest incomes are taxed at a lower rate than other incomes (see 
table 7). A few countries have maintained personal income taxation on interest income 
(Denmark, Spain); in the other countries, a withholding tax is levied, at rates ranging from 10 
to 30%. 
Table 7: Interest income taxation in Europe, in 2003 (excluding derogatory regimes) 
Interest incomes included in taxable income, with bank assessment to the administration  
Denmark   Personal income tax (maximum rate: 59%) 
  Withholding tax 
Spain Personal income tax (maximum rate: 45 %) 
Withholding tax: 18 % 
Interest income generally included in taxable income, no bank assessment to the administration requested 
Portugal Personal income tax (maximum rate: 40%) 
Withholding tax: 20%. 
Luxembourg Personal income tax (maximum rate: 42 %) 
No withholding tax.  
Germany 
 
Personal income tax (maximum rate: 48.5 %) 
Withholding tax 25% (bonds) or 30 % (bank deposits). 
UK Personal income tax (maximum rate: 30%) 
  Withholding tax: 20 % 
Choice between  withholding tax and income tax with bank assessment to the administration  
Belgium Rate: 15%  or personal income tax 
France Rate: 15% (+ 10% of social taxes) or personal income tax (+10%) 
Withholding tax 
Austria Rate: 25% 
Finland Rate: 29% 
Greece Rate: 10% (bonds) or 15% (deposits) 
Ireland Rate: 22 % 
Sweden   Rate: 30%. 
Italy Rate: 12.5 % (bonds) or 27% (deposits) 
Asset taxation  
Netherlands Tax base: 4% of market value of financial assets (shares and bonds) 
Tax rate: 30% 
  
As countries do not tax non-residents incomes, the single Market could have allowed 
households’ financial assets to escape from any taxation if invested abroad. Taxpayers are 
supposed to assess their incomes to their national tax administration, but the latter have hardly 
any possibility of checking interest income assessments. Non-taxation of non-residents 
financial incomes was clearly a typical case of unfair competition. 
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After long negotiations between EU countries and neighbouring countries (Switzerland, 
Monaco, etc…) an agreement was reached in 21 January 2003 and a directive came into effect 
on 1 July 2005. The directive sets out the generalisation of exchange of information in 
Europe. However, Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg have refused it, opting instead for a 
withholding tax (15% in 2005, 20% in 2007, 35% in 2010; 75% of the tax revenues being 
paid back to the taxpayer’s residence country). Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, 
San Marin, associate territories of the Member States have agreed to levy a similar 
withholding tax. This agreement is a compromise, but has the advantage of ensuring that each 
country may tax their residents and prevents tax competition. The agreement is an incentive 
for Member States to introduce measures against tax havens, especially when they are nearby. 
This agreement is a model in terms of tax co-ordination.  
5. The future of social contributions 
In most European countries, the ageing of populations and the structural rising trend of health 
spending can be expected to translate in a rising trend in pensions and health social 
contributions. At the same time, many countries should increase family benefits in order to 
rise birth rates, that are currently well below the level at which the population would remain 
constant. Unemployment allowances and social assistance benefits vary according to the 
unemployment rate, but until now, there have been hardly any signs that continental European 
countries will rapidly be back to full employment. Despite all the efforts planned to postpone 
the effective retirement age, an increase in social contributions seems almost certain.  
The rise in social contributions could be avoided if people resorted more to private insurance, 
but the development of private pension funds would be costly for the intermediate generation 
and pension funds premiums hardly differ from social contributions. The US experience does 
not give any evidence that private health insurance is more efficient and cheaper than public 
social insurance. Privatising partly pensions systems would allow for a stabilisation in tax to 
GDP ratios, but the counterpart would be a rise in pension funds and private insurance 
premiums that would need to be made compulsory so that all people remain covered under 
satisfactory conditions. A system combining public insurance for the poorest and private 
insurance for middle and higher incomes would make it possible to cut the tax to GDP ratio 
but would not solve the problem, since the middle class would have to pay taxes for the 
poorest and premiums for themselves. 
Do social contributions raise a tax competition issue? Not in principle, as concerns the social 
security contributions that finance more or less social benefits (pensions, unemployment, 
workplace injuries, and maternity allowances). These systems are not fully contributory since 
these have a redistributive element (for instance, executives with a low probability of being 
unemployed pay for workers who have a higher risk of being unemployed; men pay for 
women, as concerns pensions). But the contributory element is probably high enough for 
employees to realise that social benefits are part of their earnings. A rise in pension 
contributions to finance pension benefits will be accepted more easily by contributors than a 
rise in taxes. However, employees’ contributions only should be increased so that company 
competitiveness is not directly affected. The competitiveness of public pension benefits as 
compared to private pension funds should be ensured, i.e. public pension rights should be 
reaffirmed, tax incentives for pension funds should be restricted to a EET type system for the 
income tax, with no social contributions rebates.  
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Besides, only contributions financing contributory benefits should be based on the ‘wage bill’ 
while other benefits should be financed by taxes. This logic is not always applied in Europe. 
Family benefits are financed by social contributions in several countries (Belgium, France, 
Italy for instance), this can also be the case for health benefits (Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
France). This way of financing benefits is neither socially fair, nor economically justified in 
times of mass unemployment.  
Two examples show how the issue could be tackled: CSG in France and IRAP in Italy. The 
CSG was introduced in 1991 and extended in 1997, which has allowed for the abolition of 
employees’ health contributions. The CSG allows for financing part of family and health 
benefits on the basis of all households’ incomes instead of wages only. Hence, employees’ 
social contributions now finance insurance benefits only. Conversely, employers still finance 
family and health benefits. None of the successive governments have dared introduce the 
logic reform that would have consisted in basing family and health expenditure on total value 
added. Governments stepped back due to the huge size of inter-company transfers it would 
have entailed. They also feared that such a reform would have had a negative impact on the 
more capitalistic branches, assumed to be the more modern ones.  
In 1998, Italy substituted health contributions based on labour only (at the rate of 11.46%, 
however with many rebates), with IRAP (regional tax on productive activities), taxing all net 
value added components at the rate of 4.25%. This taxation ensures tax neutrality, whatever 
production technique is chosen by companies and, relatively to wage-based contributions, 
should be an incentive for companies to use more labour and fewer machines and to favour 
labour intensive activities. However, IRAP was forbidden by the ECJ, on the motive that 
VAT is the only taxation that may be applied to value added. This decision paralyses unfairly 
tax reforms. It has no justification because a tax that does not hit imports and is not 
reimbursed on exports has no competitive advantage as compared with social contributions.  
VAT weighs on imports but not on exports, contrary to social contributions. Hence trading-
off percentage points of social contributions with percentage points of VAT provides 
competitiveness gains, similarly with currency devaluation. But these gains will persist only if 
the rise in imported consumer goods prices generated by the rise in VAT has no impact on 
wages, i.e. if employees accept purchasing power losses. Let us assume that consumers 
consume 20 of imported products and 80 of domestic products. Domestic production is 100, 
20 is exported. Labour is the only production factor. Initially, prices and wages are worth 1, 
wages 80, the employers’ contribution rate is 25%. These contributions are replaced by a 
VAT of 25%. The following day, import prices are 1.2; domestic production prices on the 
domestic market are 1, export prices are 0.8 (since VAT is not paid on exports). The domestic 
economy has benefited from competitiveness gains (+20%). A tax of 4 has been shifted from 
production to imports. But these gains have been obtained thanks to a loss of 4% in workers’ 
purchasing power. If workers get a pay rise compensating for this loss, and if this pay rise 
impacts prices, then wages again, prices and wages will rise until prices have risen by 20%. 
Competitiveness gains will have been transitory. No tax reform may by miracle provide 
competitiveness gains without employees losing purchasing power. 
In Germany, environmental taxes have been raised (by 0.8% of GDP) in order to finance old-
age benefits and to avoid any rise in employers’ and employees’ contributions (which would 
have needed to rise by 0.85 percentage point each). The contributory principle has been lost. 
In Sweden, a similar reform has been introduced, aiming at rising environmental taxation by 
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1.4% of GDP from 2001 to 2010, in order to cut personal income taxation and employers’ 
contributions. 
These measures are part of the ‘double dividend’ logic: environmental taxes would have two 
advantages. They would be an incentive for reducing the use of polluting products and the 
revenues they would generate would allow for lower labour taxation. In fact, three strategies 
can be considered. The rise in environmental taxation may be counterbalanced by subsidies 
for the production of each type of products; by a subsidy to each producer depending on its 
past polluting activity; last at the level of all companies by lower employers’ contributions. 
The first two reforms have the advantage of not penalising directly polluting companies, but 
they are difficult to implement. They require an accurate knowledge of production processes. 
How would new companies be considered? How to account in permanence for technical 
progress? If polluting companies are given an incentive for changing their production 
techniques, households have no incentive for not buying goods produced with polluting 
techniques. The third strategy hits directly polluting companies, raising their production costs. 
The rise in prices is an incentive for households to buy other products. This strategy does not 
require any microeconomic analysis and allows subsidising labour.  
The combination of environmental taxation and of cuts in employers’ social contributions 
may generate, at no cost for public finances, lower pollution and less unemployment. This is 
more likely to occur if the country concerned is initially far from full employment. However 
environmental taxation revenues are all the more high that the price elasticity of demand for 
taxed products is low. A contradiction may thus arise, between ecological aims (strong and 
targeted taxation will be efficient only if it generates ex post limited revenues) and aims for 
profitable taxation in terms of tax revenues. Last a fiscal reform affecting significantly the 
structure of company costs implies costly reallocations of activities: some activities will not 
be profitable anymore and will have to be stopped. Some other activities will become 
profitable, but will require new investments. In any case, such reforms should be co-ordinated 
at the European level in order to avoid some countries becoming the preferred production site 
of polluting companies.  
It does not seem possible, in the current state of European integration to unify or even have a 
convergence of national social protection systems, while at the same time market unification 
in Europe makes it more and more difficult for different systems to coexist. A European 
company located in seven European countries has to handle seven social protection systems. 
Will this mosaic resist the increase in labour mobility in Europe and the increase in the 
number of trans-national companies? There is a major risk that tax competition operates 
through social contributions, i.e. through lower benefits or their privatisation. This would be 
in opposition with the European social model. 
Social protection should remain purely national as long as social life, trade unions and social 
negotiations are done at the domestic level. The systems today have extremely high disparities 
across Europe, in terms of pensions, unemployment and health benefits. The risk is that, under 
the principles of free competition and establishment, private insurance companies become 
entitled to compete with public pensions and their redistributive element. Hence, countries 
concerned should clearly state that the principle of free competition should not apply to social 
insurance regimes, with social or redistributive aims. Each country remains responsible for 
implementing a sufficiently attractive system at the European level, while remaining 
sufficiently redistributive. The task would of course be easier if social standards were set at 
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the European level: minimum income, old-age income, family benefits (as a percentage of 
average income in each country), universal health insurance; minimum pension income (as a 
percentage of wages in the country). Deciding if such issues are part of the European social 
model is a political choice. Adopting such standards would reduce the risk of social 
competition.  
6. Corporate taxation coordination  
The company tax burden is not easy to estimate precisely because it is difficult to breakdown 
accurately taxation affecting companies, workers and households: in which category are 
employers’ social security contributions or the Italian IRAP? For a company deciding to settle 
in a country or another, all taxation measures may have their importance, including personal 
income tax to be paid by their executives while public expenditure and transfers benefiting 
their workers will also need to be taken account.  
 Let us consider a company aiming at profit rate of π  after taxes. Its production cost is thus:  
c=(1+cc)wn+(rθ+(1−θ) π/(1-s)) k where θ is its borrowing ratio, s: the corporate tax rate, cc: 
the employers’ social contribution rate.  
The wage is: w=(1+t)(1+cs)ω  where t is the VAT rate, cs: the employers’ contribution rate 
and ω the real disposable wage.  So:  
 c=(1+cc)(1+t)(1+cs) ω n+(r θ+(1−θ) π /(1-s))k  
Thus, the total cost depends on the whole taxation, the ratio between disposable wage and 
labour productivity, finally on the corporate tax rate. Social security contributions and the 
VAT play entirely symmetrical roles. 
According to a relatively arbitrary definition (corporate taxation + wage tax + property firm 
tax+ taxes on company capital + local taxes), the company tax burden generally varies from 3 
to 5% of GDP in Europe, but is higher in France (6.1%) and Italy (5.7%) and well below in 
Germany (1.3%, see table 8). 
In addition, the analysis of companies’ financial situation shows that, almost everywhere in 
Europe, the wage share in value added was lower in 2004 than in 1990 and 1973, while the 
profitability index was higher (see table 9). It is thus currently unnecessary to consider 
introducing tax reforms increasing company profits at the expense or workers or public 
revenues. 
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Table 8: Company taxes, in % of GDP in 2002 
 Corporate 
tax 
Property 
Tax 
Others Total Employers’ social 
contributions 
Austria 2.3 2.7 0.1 5.1 7.0 
Belgium 3.5 0 0.1 3.6 8.8 
Denmark 2.9 0.2 0.5 3.6 0.3 
Finland 4.3 0 0.3 4.6  9.2 
France 2.9 1.1 2.1       6.1 11.1 
Germany 1.0 0 0.3 1.3 7.1 
Greece       3.8 0 0.0 3.8 5.6 
Ireland 3.7 0.2       0.3 4.2 2.7 
Italy 3.2 0 2.5 5.7 8.7 
Luxembourg 8.6 0 1.8 10.4 5.2 
Netherlands 3.5 0 0.7 4.2 4.6 
Portugal 3.6 0 0.2 3.8 7.0 
Spain 3.2 0 0.0 3.2 8.9 
Sweden 2.5 2.4 0.4 5.3 12.2 
UK 2.9 0 1.7 4.6 3.4 
Czech Republic 4.6 0 0.1 4.7 11.1 
Hungary 2.4 1.2 0.2 3.8 9.1 
Poland 2.0 0.2 0.7 3.1 4.8 
Slovak Republic 2.7 0 0 2.7 8.3 
Japan 3.1 0 1.2 4.3 4.5 
USA 1.8 0      1.6 3.4         3.4 
Source: OECD (2004) 
Table 9. Indicators of companies’ situation 
 Wage share in value added Profitability 
index* 
      1970     1990 2004          2005* 
Germany 72.1 66.8 65.6 100.9 
Austria 73.2 77.2 69.6 141.9 
Belgium 66,6 70,1 70,7 96.7 
Denmark 74,5 70.6 68.1 139.2 
Spain 72.5 68.3 65.3 104.7 
Finland 71.7 73.5 63.0  154.3 
France 73.7 69.6 66.3 122.5 
Greece      78.1 72.2 64.6 100.5 
Ireland 79.4 67.4      55.2 177.3 
Italy 79.4 69.9 64.1 120.6 
Netherlands 70.8 66.4 69.2 96.1 
Portugal 72.9 67.0 76.4 70.7 
UK 74.1 75.4 74.2 133.6 
Sweden 70.9 70.7 69.4 136.5 
Japan       68.5 69.3 66.2 83.8 
USA 72.5 68.1 65.9 134.7 
* 100 in 1970-73.  
Source: EU 
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6.1.Local taxes on firms 
Companies are subject to local taxation in all European countries, except in Sweden and the 
UK. Local taxation raises four problems: the tax base must be located, which necessarily 
implies taxing production factors (labour, fixed assets, buildings) rather than company 
benefits; local taxation may come in contradiction with national policy orientations, in 
particular as regards tax relief; it generates inequalities between local administrations due to 
the discrepancies in tax potential and these inequalities are cumulative; it generates tax 
competition between local administrations, at the detriment of deprived areas. European 
countries have tackled these problems in different ways, also varying from time to time, 
ranging from the abolishment of local company taxation in the UK to autonomous local 
taxation of productive activities in most countries. In term of tax competition, a choice has to 
be made between these two models, since maintaining local taxation may require the 
introduction of a minimum rate at the European level. 
All European countries, except Sweden and the United Kingdom, have a taxation of 
company’s property. Seven Member States - Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg and Portugal - use specific local company taxation, levied on several bases 
(fixed assets, wage bill or number of employees, profits, value added, etc). Several countries 
introduced reforms of local company taxation in the 1990’s, either to reduce tax competition 
on these taxes, or to ensure a better adequacy with national taxation policy objectives. Thus, 
in Germany, the ‘professional tax’, previously set on fixed assets and wage bills, is now based 
on profits. In France, the reform of the professional tax, undertaken from 1999, led to the 
progressive suppression of the wage bill from the base, in order to reduce labour costs. 
Moreover, the ceiling of the professional tax as a percentage of value added implies that many 
companies pay local taxes as a proportion of their value added. In Italy, IRAP directly is 
based on value added.  Each of these tax bases has specific advantages or disadvantages (se 
table 10). 
Table 10. The choice of local taxation base 
Base Location Economic effect Revenue Volatility Profit volatiliy 
Wage bill Easy Negative on  employment  Increase 
Fixed assets Easy Negative on   investment and 
industry  
 Increase 
Value added Difficult    
Gross surplus Very difficult  High Reduction 
Profits Very difficult Negative on retained earnings Very high Strong reduction 
 
Local taxation on companies raises problems similar to tax competition between countries. 
There seems to be a trend towards taxing value added. Rates should be relatively uniform in 
each country, but could possibly be slightly modified depending on specific advantages 
provided by the local administration or specific disadvantages generated by the company: a 
minimum rate could be settled. Tax competition should be regulated by the State, with lower 
rates being allowed for local administration suffering from high unemployment and revenue 
losses being offset through state funding. This would require that the State transfers revenues 
between local administration, in order to compensate for their different tax potentials. 
Incorporating local taxation in corporate taxation co-ordination would remain a difficult issue 
at the European level. 
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6.2. Will corporate taxation survive? 
Although corporate taxes amount only to a small share of tax revenues, they are a very 
sensitive issue for companies. For the last twenty years, governments have convinced 
themselves that company profitability was crucial for investment and therefore employment. 
Besides, tax competition has strengthened: with the opening of frontiers implied by 
globalisation, large companies put domestic tax systems into competition when making their 
location decisions. So, almost all EU Member States have reduced their corporate tax rates in 
the 1990’s.   
Corporation tax revenues are highly volatile since they are based, in a non-linear way and 
with variable delays, on company profits that fluctuate with the economic cycle (see table 11). 
Corporation tax revenues rose from 2.3% of GDP in 1995 to 3% in 2000, following the 
improvement of companies’ accounts (rise in mark-ups, lower interest rates) before falling 
down to 2.6% in 2002. Corporation tax revenues are relatively similar in all European 
countries, about 3% of the GDP. However Austrian and even more German revenues are 
dramatically lower than in the average EU, many entrepreneurs choosing to set individual 
companies. Revenues are much higher in Finland (since 1997, owing to new technology 
activities), Netherlands and even more Luxembourg (owing to high profits in the banking 
sector).  
Table 11. Corporate taxes, % of GDP 
 1980 1990 1995 2000 2002 2002* 
Austria 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 5.2 
Belgium 2.2 2.4 2.8 3.6 3.5 3.5 
Denmark 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.4 2.9 2.9 
Spain 1.2 2.9 1.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 
Finland 1.4 2.1 1.8 6.0 4.3 4.5 
France 2.1 2.3 2.1 3.1 2.9 6.1 
Germany 2.0 1.7 1.1 1.8 1.0 1.3 
Greece 0.9 1.6 2.0 4.6 3.8 3.8 
Ireland 1.4 1.7 2.8 3.8 3.7 3.9 
Italy 2.4 3.9 3.6 2.9 3.2 5.7 
Luxembourg 6.6 6.4 7.4 7.2 8.6 10.4 
The Netherlands 2.9 3.2 3.1 4.2 3.5 4.1 
Portugal 0.9 2.3 2.6 4.1 3.6 3.6 
UK 2.9 4.1 3.3 3.6 2.9 4.5 
Sweden 1.2 1.7 2.9 4.0 2.4 3.1 
EU15 2.1 2.7 2.3 3.0 2.6  
Hungary   1.9 2.2 2.4  
Poland   2.8 2.5 2.0  
Czech Republic    4.9 3.8 4.6  
Japan 5.5 6.5 4.2 3.6 3.1 3.2 
USA 2.9 2.1 2 .6 2.6 1.8 3.2 
* With local  wages and property taxes,… 
Source: OECD, Revenue Statistics, 2004. 
Most EU Member States have cut their corporate tax rates in the 1990’s (see table 12). 
Germany had two tax rates: 36 and 50% (for respectively distributed and retained profits, the 
latter being more heavily taxed because they were exempt from dividend taxation), which 
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were cut down to a single rate of 25% by the reform introduced in 2000. The French rates 
(42% on distributed profits, 37% on retained earnings, less taxed in order to support 
investment) were cut down to 34.33%. In Denmark and Sweden, rates declined from 50 to 
30%. Taxation is dramatically low in Ireland (12.5% in general, but 10% for industrial 
sectors). Except Ireland, rates range from 28 to 35%. However, the comparison is made 
difficult by the existence of local taxation that may be levied on profits (Germany), value 
added (Italy), capital (France) and even more by substantial differences in the assessment of 
the tax base (in particular depreciation rules). In the 1990’s many countries have widened the 
tax base while cutting their tax rates, in order to design a more neutral system. 
Table 12. Corporate tax rates in 1990 and 2004 
            1990           2004 
Austria 30 34  (25 in 2005) 
Belgium 43 34 
Denmark 50 30 
Finland 33 29 (26 in 2005) 
France 42 distributed profit 
37 retained profit 
35.4 
Germany 36 distributed profit 
50 retained profit 
25 (39.3 with solidarity tax and local tax) 
Greece 46/ 40 industry 35 (32 in 2005) 
Ireland 43/ 10 industry 12.5/ 10 industry 
Italy 36             33  (37.25% with IRAP) 
Luxembourg 34 22.9 
The Netherlands 35 34.5 
Portugal 34 27.5 
Spain 35 35 
Sweden 52 28 
United Kingdom 35 30 
EU15 (average) 41.8   34.7 
Source:  
New Member States have generally lower rates than the old Member States (see table 13) and 
they consider cutting further their rates so as to compensate for the abolition of state aid to 
companies, changes in basis determination rules and to attract foreign direct investment. 
In a report on company taxation in Europe, the Commission (2002) measured the extent of the 
divergences between tax systems. It calculated an average effective tax rate, i.e. the tax rate 
levied on a standard investment with a return of 20% before tax (see table 14). The charges 
levied on companies for domestic investments are relatively disparate in Europe. However, 
rates range from 28% to 32% in most countries, except Ireland (10% only) and Sweden 23%, 
whereas Belgium, France and Germany have tax rates of 35%. Apart from Ireland, these 
disparities are not likely to generate substantial capital movements. However, the risk exists 
that the downward trend in tax rates turns into excessive tax competition. 
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Table 13. Corporate tax rates in the New Member States 
 2004 
Cyprus 10 
Estonia 0 (retained profit)/26 
Hungary 16 
Latvia 15 
Lithuania 15 
Malta 35 
Poland 22 
Slovak Republic 25 
Slovenia 25 
Czech Republic  24 
 
Table 14. Effective corporate taxation in the EU 
In 2001 Nominal corporate tax rate Rate used for the calculation* Average effective taxation rate
Austria 34 34 27.9 
Belgium 39 40.17 34.5 
Denmark 30 30 27.3 
Finland 29 29 26.6 
France 33.33 36.43 34.7 
Germany 25 39.35 34.9 
Greece 37.5 37.50 28.0 
Ireland 10 10 10.5 
Italy 36 40.25 27.6 
Luxembourg 30 37.45 32.2 
The Netherlands 35 35 31.0 
Spain 35 35 31.0 
Portugal 32 35.20 30.7 
Sweden 28 28 22.9 
United Kingdom 30 30 28.3 
* It includes corporate and local taxes. 
Source: European Commission, 2002. 
 
The basic principles for corporate taxation 
Corporate taxation can be considered as a tax on companies’ shareholders or as a tax on 
companies themselves, as a counterpart of the advantages companies draw from the 
infrastructures of the country where they have located their production (from this point of 
view, taxation should also be levied on borrowed capital). Benefit taxation may rely on two 
principles. According to the source principle, a country may tax all benefits generated at 
home, either by residents or non-residents. Thus, in a country applying the source principle, 
domestic benefits of foreign groups entities will be taxed and national companies will not 
incorporate their profits earned abroad in their taxable profits (as a counterpart, foreign losses 
will not be deducted). According to the source principle, corporation tax is a tax on 
companies, and corporate tax rates may differ between countries to reflect differences in the 
services provided to companies.   
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A country applying the residence principle must tax all incomes earned by national residents, 
whether earned in the country or abroad. Foreign losses can be deducted from profits. 
According to this principle, corporate taxation is levied on company owners.   
At the international level, the source principle should apply. Residence is an ambiguous 
concept for companies. The residence principle would allow firms to escape taxation if they 
locate in a tax haven. So in a given country foreign firms could benefit from an unfair 
competitiveness advantage by escaping to taxation. With the source principle, all firms 
operating in a given country are subject to the same tax rate: this ensures neutrality for capital 
imports. But it may be feared that a company from a given country is encouraged to invest in 
countries with low tax rates: there is no neutrality for capital exports. This fear is not justified 
if low rates only compensate for a lack of infrastructure, geographical distance, political 
risks… The other problem is profit shifting: firms could try to localise their profits in 
countries with low tax rates by manipulating transfer prices, royalties and interest payments.  
Some countries accept that their international companies produce consolidated benefits, in 
other words, the principle of residence: these companies can consolidate all losses and 
benefits of their subsidiaries or branches world-wide, deducting the taxes paid abroad from 
their domestic taxes. 
 
Corporate taxation and the single market  
The current system is unsatisfactory. Two kinds of critics can be made. For companies (and 
for the Commission), the main problem is that countries have different rules for assessing tax 
bases, which complicates the operating of trans-national companies. Discriminations 
according to the nationality of parent companies and subsidiaries remain. Some incomes are 
subject to double taxation. Transfers between parent companies and their subsidiaries are 
managed under a disparate set of bilateral conventions that must be re-examined when one of 
the partner countries modifies its legislation.  
For Member States, the main problem is tax rates disparities. Large companies are incited to 
optimise their taxation by carefully choosing the location of their headquarters, of their 
subsidiaries, of their financial transactions. They can use transfer prices, intra-group 
borrowing and royalties to locate their profits in the countries where tax rates are the lower. 
This generates costly surveillance policies for governments and exerts pressure on Member 
States to decrease their taxation rate. The need to avoid costly tax competition, the European 
single market, the rising number of European companies (settled in several European 
countries) make it increasingly necessary to co-ordinate corporate taxation at a European 
level. 
The Commission tries mainly to ensure tax neutrality for trans-national investments: firms 
should be able to invest anywhere in Europe without taxation being a source of economic 
distortion. Directives have been implemented in order to avoid double taxation and to limit 
tax optimisation practices. The Commission has also introduced procedures to fight harmful 
tax competition among European countries. However, corporate taxation co-ordination at the 
European level can only be limited because of Member States’ taxation autonomy.   
An option would be to generate a progressive convergence of the tax systems in the EU. This 
convergence would suppose agreements on taxation principles, tax base harmonisations and 
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minimal tax rates. This would raise difficult issues: how to account for local taxation? Should 
reduced rates for less-developed countries, areas or sectors in difficult economic situations be 
authorised?  Who, between the Member States and the Commission, would have the initiative 
of introducing measures aiming at reducing taxes temporarily (in bad times) or permanently 
(to boost R&D spending, for example)? Accounting for the subsidiarity principle in taxation, 
the Commission gave up pursuing this strategy.   
On December 1, 1997, the Ecofin council adopted a Code of Conduct, i.e. a set of measures 
aiming at fighting harmful tax competition. 230 regimes were pointed at as potentially likely 
to generate unfair competition, i.e. at impacting the location of activities within the European 
Union on artificial grounds. Derogatory tax regimes where Member States offer preferential 
tax treatment, i.e. support a category of companies (for example non residents) to the 
detriment of the others (for example residents) are contrary to the Code of Conduct. But low 
taxation – applied to everyone- is not considered unfair and is seen as a sign of good 
management of public finances. The Code of Conduct made it possible to remove a certain 
number of preferential tax systems. But the core issue remains:  what global tax competition 
is acceptable? 
 
On tax base harmonization  
The Commission (2001) suggested a reform of the tax base, with four alternative possibilities.  
Two suppose a compulsory system:  
- A European Union company Income Taxation (EUCIT) will unify corporate taxation 
all around Europe. In the long run, it is the best solution, but it supposes that countries 
agree to lose all autonomy in that field. Countries with low tax rates will have to raise 
them. They can agree only if their possibilities to subsidize their firms are increased. 
So, Member States should agree to leave all industrial policies at the European level. It 
is not realistic nowadays.  
- A harmonised Tax base (HTB) unifies the bases, but lets each country free to choose 
their tax rate. But a common basis main would exacerbate tax rate competition. 
Two introduce an optional system for European firms:  
- In the Common Tax base system (CTB), a European firm could chose to compute its 
whole profits according to some specific European rule.  
- In the Home State Taxation system (HST), a European firm could chose to compute its 
whole profit according to the rules of the country of the parent company. 
In both cases, the profits of a group would be shared between the various Member States in 
which it operates, according to some allocation keys (added value, wage bill, etc), each State 
taxing the profits returning to their country. The principle of profit sharing, already used in the 
US and Canada, according to appropriate allocation keys impedes profit shifting practices.   
However, these proposals raise many difficulties: 
- In the HST system, companies would have the possibility to choose between 25 rules. 
Some countries may choose very favourable regulations to attract headquarters. The 
system would be incontrollable by national administrations. Tax competition will not 
be totally avoided. 
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- Even in the CTB system multinational firms would be taxed differently (and, in fact, 
less) than national firms. 
- It seems difficult that subsidiaries of a multinational corporation make a tax assessment 
only to the tax administration of the country of the head office. How would the 
coherence of the subsidiaries’ tax assessment be ensured in the host country? Profit 
assessment allows national administration to check the consistency of value added and 
wage bill assessment. The simplification at firms’ level has a counterpart, which is the 
loss of control for national administrations. 
 
On tax rate harmonisation 
So we do not see how Europe could escape painful negotiations on convergence of corporate 
taxation. Corporate taxation is not the most appropriate tool to attract firms to locate in less 
developed countries or deprived areas, due to risks of profit shifting (companies may benefit 
from low tax rates in a country while producing mainly elsewhere). Our preferred strategy 
would be to exchange the corporate taxation convergence against more freedom given to 
Member States to subsidize their companies. This could be done in four steps:   
- Some convergence of the tax bases.  
- Clear recognition of the source principle. In fact, the logic would be to tax the ‘net operating 
surplus’ rather than profits. European taxation could progressively move in this direction with 
the introduction of taxes like the Italian IRAP. 
- Introduction of minimum rates, depending on the level of development reached by the 
country, for instance 20% for New Member States and 30% for the old Member States. The 
lower minimum rate will increase as countries converge. Countries providing specific 
advantages to companies could of course set a rate higher than 30%, at their own risk.  
- Less developed countries would be allowed to subsidise their companies (possibly via the 
EU structural funds), with value added or wage bill bases, rather than through low corporate 
tax rates, so as to minimise the risks of profit shifting. Company subsidies could also be 
allowed more easily for regions or economic sectors in difficulty, aid for innovation and 
research. 
In any case, the fight against tax havens should be strengthened, at the European or world 
levels. Companies and financial institutions should not be allowed to have subsidiaries or to 
transfer funds in these countries. 
 
On dividends taxation  
Value added goes to wages, interest, dividend incomes and non distributed profits. Fair 
taxation would ensure that all these elements are similarly taxed. This would suppose, in 
particular, that social contributions (for pensions, unemployment benefits, etc.) are well 
differentiated from taxes. For interest income, taxation should apply only to real interests.  
Similarly, the logic would be that real capital gains are taxed like dividends. Then, the 
question of corporate taxation arises. Can this tax be considered as a tax on the owners of the 
company, which would justify taxation under the residence principle or like a tax on the 
company (but in this case, why not tax interests)?  
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Let us consider a country where the corporate tax rate is 33.3%; the maximum income tax rate 
is 50%; the tax rate on bond interest income is 25%. Effective taxation is 50% on high wages; 
42% on real bonds income (for an interest rate of 5% and an inflation rate of 2%). The tax rate 
on dividends is 33.3% (if dividends are completely tax exempt), 50% (if dividends benefit 
from an imputation system), 50% (if they benefit from a rebate of 50%), 66.7% in the event of 
double taxation. The tax rate on capital gains is 33.3% if they are exempt from income tax 
(and if capital gains equal retained profits); 50% if they are taxed at 25%. On the whole, the 
coherence of taxation is not automatically guaranteed.  
The imputation system is logical if corporate tax is considered to be a tax on company 
owners. The double taxation system could be justified if corporate tax is a specific tax on 
firms.  But this would suppose that the corporate tax is also levied on interests and that its rate 
is strongly reduced. The schedular tax system is a compromise that makes it possible to adapt 
income tax and corporate tax rates.  
In 2003, five countries maintained the imputation system (see table 15):  France2, Italy, Spain, 
Finland and Sweden. One country has integral double taxation: Ireland (but the corporate tax 
rate is very low). The Netherlands tax financial assets independently of their effective returns. 
Dividends are exempt of income tax in Greece. In six countries, dividends are subject to a 
double taxation, but with a schedular tax system: they are incorporated in total income after 
multiplication by a reduction factor (Germany, Austria and Luxembourg).  If t is the marginal 
rate of income tax, s the corporate tax rate and x the reduction factor, the total tax is: s + (1 – 
s)x instead of being t. This system is all the more unfair for the taxpayer that t is low. For 
example, if s = 33 %, x = 0.5, a household taxed marginally at 50 % will be taxed at 49.75 % 
on its dividends; a household taxed marginally at 30% will be taxed at 43%. This system has 
no fair logic; x is arbitrary. In four countries, capital gains are not subject to taxation. Only six 
countries ensure the same tax rate on dividends and capital gains.  
The ECJ requests that the same system is applied to domestic and foreign dividends. In 
practice, this forces countries to adopt an income-tax scheduled system. The fairness of this 
system is arguable. Let us imagine for example a country A where the corporate tax rate is 
33.3 % and with a scheduled taxation of dividends at 25%.  The income tax rate is 50% (see 
table 16). In the neighbouring country, B or C, the corporate tax rate is 20%. The total tax rate 
for savers in A, who invest in B, is 40%. This is not justified since profitability is the same in 
B and A. But if the low tax rate compensates for some economic disadvantages, as in C, such 
a discrepancy can be justified. However, this compensation would not exist in an imputation 
system. The imputation system reduces the impact of tax competition. So, switching from an 
imputation system to a schedular system supposes an overall agreement on tax rates levels, 
countries with high rates accepting lower rates in less developed countries or having natural 
disadvantages. Another option would be to standardize corporate tax rates, to maintain the 
imputation system while allowing countries to give direct subsidies to their companies. 
                                                          
2 France adopted the schedular system in 2005.  
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Table15. Taxation of shares’ income in Europe  
Legislation 2003 Dividends Capital gains Taxation rate  
Dividends1/Global2
Imputation system  
France IT + social contributions; tax 
credit (50%) 
26% if cessions are above a 
ceiling. 
   57.7% /53.6% 
Italy Withholding tax (12.5 %) or IT 
with tax credit (58.73%) 
12.5% 42.25%/42.25% 
Sweden IT (specific rate 28%); tax credit 
(28/72 %) 
28%                 28%/28% 
Finland IT (specific rate 29%); tax credit 
(29/71%) 
29%                 29%/29% 
Spain IT (45%) with tax credit (40%) 15%                49.0%/46.35% 
Schedular system 
United Kingdom IT with specific rate (10% or 
32.5%) and tax credit (10%) 
IT (with rebate according to 
detention length if capital gains 
exceed a ceiling)  
             45.75%/51.75% 
Portugal Withholding tax : 20% 10 % on real capital gains               44%/38% 
Denmark IT with specific rate (28 or 43%) As dividends 60.1% 
Belgium Withholding tax: 25% Exoneration                 50%/45% 
Germany    IT on 50% of dividends  Exoneration             54 %/44.15% 
Austria    IT on 50% of dividends Exoneration             50.5%/39% 
Luxembourg    IT on 50% of dividends 
 
Exoneration              44.3%/35% 
Exoneration 
Greece Exoneration Exoneration 37.5% 
Double Taxation 
Ireland IT (42 %) 20% on real capital gains 47.8%/32.4% 
Asset taxation 
The  Netherlands Rate: 30%. Base: 4 % of asset 
value. 
 46% 
1. We assume that dividends are taxed at the maximum income tax rate. We include the amount of the corporate tax already paid by the company 
on behalf of the shareholders. 
2. We assume that the company made a 10% profit before-tax, of which 2 points are distributed in the form of dividends. Capital gains equal 
retained profit; total capital gains are imposed. 
Table 16.  Savings’ profitability for a resident of country A 
 Country A Country B Country C 
Profitability ex-ante 15% 15% 12% 
Corporate tax rate 33.3% 20%  16.7% 
Profitability after CT. 10% 12% 10% 
Prof. with imputation 7.5% 7.5% 6% 
Prof. with 25% taxation  7.5% 9% 7.5% 
 
7. Conclusion      
Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions in the field of tax harmonization. Until now, 
European countries seem to have more or less succeeded in maintaining their desired level of 
redistribution and public expenditure. However, it is difficult to say if lower taxation on the 
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richest and companies results from globalisation constraints or reflects rising trends of liberal 
ideas.  
Europe will have to live for a long time in a contradiction between capital and goods markets 
where unification is rapid, and taxation (and more generally budgetary, social and political 
institutions) that remain national. In far as taxation is concerned, the problem is institutional:  
Community authorities and the States should care for maintaining the ability of countries to 
tax their residents, and political: tax co-ordination will be easier if all governments agree 
explicitly to maintain the European social model, i.e. significant and redistributive taxation to 
finance public expenditure and transfers.  
Basically, Europe can choose between two strategies. The first consists in maintaining the 
European social model, characterized by a significant level of transfers, public expenditure 
and thus of taxation. The system will have to be preserved from tax competition by 
harmonisation in Europe that will have to include the prohibition of unfair competition, the 
introduction of minima rates in certain cases, and by tough measures against tax havens at a 
worldwide scale. The European Social Model will have to rely on its comparative advantages 
(free education and health for all, public infrastructures, social security benefits) to remain 
competitive in spite of globalisation. The second strategy consists on the contrary in moving 
towards a more liberal model, where privatisation of welfare will allow for cuts in tax rates 
that are assumed to promote employment, education and vocational training, savings and 
investment. This strategy supposes that Europeans agree to live in a Society with rising 
inequalities. Tax competition would then a tool to support this trend. 
But what should be done at the European level if European countries wish to make different 
choices?  
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